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Abstract
In this paper we establish a link between probabilistic cost efficiency and bounded ra-
tionality in the newsvendor model. This establishes a framework where bounded rationality
can be examined rigorously by statistical methods. The paper offers a relatively deep theo-
retical analysis of underorders/overorders in the newsvendor model. The theory is supported
by empirical findings from our analysis of empirical data from laboratory experiments. In
particular, we observe that underorders are systematically larger than overorders, an issue
that our theoretical model explains. From statistical tests we conclude that all variability in
our data can be explained by probabilistic cost efficiency and risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
Gino and Pisano (2008) argue that greater emphasis should be placed on behavioral aspects
of operations management. At the time of their writing, the majority of the operations man-
agement literature was concerned with fully rational agents, and departures from rationality
assumptions were largely ignored. Today, however, the field has matured; see Croson et al.
(2012) for a review. The present paper aims to contribute to this interesting stream of literature.
Discrete choice models emerged in the 1970’s, with the pioneering work of D. McFadden on
random utility maximization, see McFadden (1974) and Train (2003). The theory has been
applied with success within several different fields in economics, and has obvious relevance to
newsvendor behavior. Retailers often base their decisions on partial and incomplete information
leading to a certain type of randomness in ordering. Managers should seek to understand the
nature of this randomness and use their knowledge to improve performance. It is hence of some
surprise that this approach is largely ignored in the literature on the newsvendor problem. A
notable exception is Su (2008).
Our paper combines the framework of experimental economics with theory of bounded ratio-
nality. In an experimental study, Becker-Peth et. al (2013), the participants were asked to
suggest order quantities in a standard newsvendor model. They were fully informed in the
sense that a unique optimal order could be inferred from their information, but they seldom
if ever suggested this optimal quantity. It is thus interesting to ask why this happened, and
to relate our observations to theory of probabilistic choice. This approach was initiated by Su
(2008), who obtained important new insights into this connection. In our paper we establish a
more streamlined approach where these insights can be reached with a minimum of effort. Our
more efficient framework enables us to extend the analysis of Su (2008) in several new directions.
A perfectly rational newsvendor orders a quantity q that maximizes expected profit. Su (2008)
considers boundedly rational agents and discusses several alternative lines of enquiry. In Su’s
(2008) study, less well-informed agents can choose any order quantity, and the probability for
choosing the size of an order is defined in terms of a multinomial logit (MNL) model.
An MNL model can be derived in many ways, some of which are discussed and referenced in Su
(2008). The most common derivation is probably that based on random utility theory described
by Manski (1977). A basic formulation used by Su (2008) is the following: “all alternatives are
candidates for selection, but more attractive alternatives are chosen with larger probability”.
This statement is a necessary consequence of the multinomial logit model. What appears to be
less well known is that a modified version of this statement is in fact sufficient; that is, if more
attractive states are chosen with larger probability, then the model must be a multinomial logit
model, see Erlander (2010). Here a state is referring to an allocation of choices made by several
agents, and a state is more attractive if it leads to a larger aggregate utility.
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In our paper we will use the following definition of bounded rationality: Agents are boundedly
rational if and only if more attractive states are chosen with larger probability. In the end our
definition of bounded rationality will lead us to a MNL model, and it might hence appear that
our definition makes no difference. There is, however, a very good reason for taking that partic-
ular definition as a starting point; we want to use our definition to formulate a statistical test of
bounded rationality. Su (2008), too, wanted to test for this, but had to settle for a test of the
parameter in his model. Formally there is nothing wrong with his test, but it does not answer
our main question; “are the observations consistent with bounded rationality?”
To our knowledge there is only one relevant test discussed in the literature; Erlander’s graphical
test for probabilistic cost efficiency, see Erlander (2010). Erlander takes the verbal statement
“more attractive states are chosen with larger probability” as his starting point, and formalizes
that statement into a direct statistical test of his definition. The reader should note that a
similar approach fails if we instead start out with a definition based on random utility theory.
From aggregate data we can never confirm that agents maximize random utility. Many other
models lead to the same functional form, and data may be perfectly replicated by a MNL model
even when random utility fails. In many contexts this is not at all a problem, but it effectively
excludes the type of analysis that we are discussing here. That partly explains why it was diffi-
cult for Su (2008) to formulate a suitable test, and that very few such tests have been discussed
in the literature.
In the paper we will correct Erlander’ test and extend the test to a version which is applica-
ble to small samples. The test has a compelling diagnostic part we can use to check if the
agents behave according to our definition. In the theoretical part of the paper we study the
classical pull-to-center effect extending the analysis in Su (2008). In particular we prove that
when agents behave according to probabilistic cast efficiency, we can expect that the amount
of underordering is typically larger than the amount of overordering. The results in the theory
section are supported by an empirical analysis where we use the data from Becker-Peth et. al
(2013). We suggest a simple likelihood ratio test which seems stronger than Erlander’s test.
The combination of the two tests appears to be very well suited for data of this kind.
The IIA property (independence of irrelevant alternatives) is a much debated issue in discrete
choice theory and there exist several ways of testing if the IIA property is a problem in data.
Problems with IIA typically occur when identical alternatives are listed multiple times, e.g.,
if yellow buses are painted red or blue, this should not make bus a more likely alternative for
transport (color is irrelevant). In our paper the agents choose how much to order. As the order
quantity is an ordinal variable with no special attributes, problems with multiple listings cannot
occur and the IIA property is not something we will need to address here.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review some of the most relevant
literature. In Section 3, we review the theory of probabilistic cost efficiency and discuss Er-
lander’s graphical test in detail. We explain that Erlander’s formula for the confidence band is
in fact always wrong, and work out the correct version. We extend the test to a version that
allows for small samples and also propose a new and very simple alternative to Erlander’s test.
In Section 4 we enter into a relatively deep theoretical discussion of underordering/overordering
in the newsvendor model. In particular we prove that under certain conditions we can expect a
systematic skewness in underorders versus overorders. In Section 5, we analyze our experimen-
tal data and conclude that all the variation in our data can be explained by a combination of
probabilistic cost efficiency and risk aversion. A technical summary of the paper is provided in
Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some concluding remarks. To enhance the readability
of the paper, the major part of the technical proofs has been placed in the appendix.
2 Literature review
In the single-period newsvendor model, a retailer wishes to order a quantity q from a manufac-
turer. Demand D is a random variable, and the retailer selects an order quantity q maximizing
his expected profit. When the distribution of D is known, the problem of determining an opti-
mal quantity is easily solved. The basic problem is very simple, but it appears to have endless
variations. There is now a very large body of literature on such problems; for further reading,
refer to the reviews by Cacho´n (2003) and Qin et al. (2011) and the numerous references therein.
The analysis conducted in this paper relates to three main streams of literature.
• Discussions of probabilistic cost efficiency
• Discussions of bounded rationality in economics
• Discussions of the use of laboratory experiments to build better operations management
models
In this section we provide a brief review of some of the literature related to the discussion in our
paper.
2.1 Probabilistic cost efficiency
The notion of probabilistic cost efficiency was introduced by Smith (1978). The theory has been
expanded and improved in several publications by S. Erlander and T. Smith, and a compre-
hensive discussion is provided in the monograph by Erlander (2010). The basic approach is to
formulate a framework in which agents can choose from a list of alternative actions. Each action
is associated with a cardinal utility, which in our context is interpreted as the cost of the ac-
tion, i.e., a negative utility. If we assume that a pattern with higher total utility is always more
probable than one with lower total utility, the resulting model will be a multinomial logit model.
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The theory is very versatile, and admits generalizations where actions are constrained by K
linear restrictions on the form A P⊥ = B⊥. In this case, an assumption of probabilistic cost
efficiency implies a model formulation of the form
P = exp[(u1, u2, . . . , uK+1)A + βU] (1)
Here, P = (p1, . . . , pM ) are the probabilities of choosing actions 1, . . . ,M . A is an (K + 1)×M
matrix and B = (b1, . . . , bM ) is a vector specifying the constraints on P. Actions have utilities
U = (U1, . . . , UM ) and the numbers (u1, u2, . . . , uK+1) and β ≥ 0 are all constants. In the
special case where K = 0, the constraint p1 + · · ·+pM = 1 leads to the multinomial logit model.
See Jo¨rnsten and Ubøe (2010) for a discussion and applications of the general framework.
2.2 Bounded rationality
Etzioni (1986) argues that natural human behavior is nonrational, largely governed by emotions
and inconsistent values. Rational behavior is artificial in the sense that it results from a def-
inition of cost, and what we define as rational behavior is hence largely a consequence of our
definition of cost. Without a distinct definition of cost, no behavior would be rational.
From the above line of reasoning it comes as no surprise that agents are boundedly rational
in the sense that they do not always choose the optimal, that is, the least costly, alternative.
Only in cases where agents are fully informed and have a definite and indisputable definition
of cost can we expect to observe fully rational behavior. In all other cases, there is a nonzero
probability of mistakes.
The literature on boundedly rational agents is huge. An excellent survey of many streams is
Conlisk (1996). Conlisk (1996) discusses four reasons for incorporating bounded rationality.
• There is empirical evidence for bounded rationality
• Models of bounded rationality are useful
• The logic of unbounded rationality is sometimes flawed
• Suboptimal decisions incur less cost
These reasons are discussed in detail and are supported by a long list of references. A paper
with an interesting relation to the fourth reason is one by Mattsson and Weibull (2002).
Mattsson and Weibull (2002) assume that agents have a set of deterministic preferences over a
set of alternatives. Agents are fully rational, and can solve any relevant maximization problem.
However, a higher probability of choosing an alternative requires more effort, and in their model
the marginal disutility of always choosing the optimal alternative is assumed to be infinite.
There is thus a situation with well-defined costs, but in which the optimal decision for any deci-
sion maker is nevertheless to choose positive mistake probabilities. The option of never making
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mistakes is simply too costly/time-consuming, and the resulting choice between alternatives is
not deterministic. In this kind of setting, there is hence a rational bound on how rational the
agents can be.
Matejka and McKay (2013) take the rational inattention approach (Sims (1998, 2003)) to model
how information frictions influence the behavior of utility-maximizing agents. When agents have
no a priori preferences, choices are distributed in accordance with a standard multinomial logit
model. Choice probabilities are systematically shifted, however, under nonuniform priors. The
basic idea of the rational inattention approach is that information is costly to acquire, a point
of view shared by Mattsson and Weibull (2002).
2.3 Laboratory experiments
In a classical laboratory experiment, Schweitzer and Cacho´n (2000) observe that agents order
too little in cases where the profit is high and too much when the profit is low, the so-called
“pull-to-center” effect. They offer two alternative explanations for this. The first is that agents
seek to minimize the absolute difference between realized demand and quantity ordered. The
second is that the decision making is biased because of comparisons with previous situations that
may not be relevant to the present situation. They explain this by three heuristics by which the
agents adapt by anchoring to one quantity and adjusting toward another, for example, anchoring
to the previous order and adjusting toward previously observed demand.
Bostian et al. (2008) investigate these heuristics through a laboratory experiment involving a
learning model inspired by Camerer and Ho (1999) in which the agents adaptively learn from
their ordering decision. Like Schweitzer and Cacho´n (2000), they observe orders that are too
small in high-profit situations and too large when profit is low. Their comparison supports the
learning model in terms of fit to data. In this model, the agents learn adaptively which orders
yield high profits and which yield low profits.
Bolton et al. (2012) compare a group of students with a group of experienced managers and, like
Schweitzer and Cacho´n (2000), observe that the subjects too often order too little in high-profit
situations and too much in low-profit situations. They conclude that the managers do not use
the information or task training any more efficiently than the students.
Wachtel and Dexter (2010) review studies that largely confirm the findings of Bolton et al.
(2012). Their focus is on staffing of operating theaters at hospitals. The order in this context
is the number of staff needed for a surgeon to perform the tasks required in an operating room
efficiently. Random demand is the number of patients. They conclude that both voluntary
students as well as operating theater managers systematically allocate too many staff members
to surgeons who do not need them and too few to the ones that do. Because the students have
no reason to take organizational aspects into account but still make the same systematic error
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as the managers, the authors argue that this is evidence of an innate psychological bias.
Another possible explanation for the ordering bias proposed by Su (2008) is that newsvendors
simply make random errors in ordering. Bias would then occur because there is more room to
err toward the mean than away from it. Kremer et al. (2010) investigate this idea by allow-
ing one group of subjects to place an order in a standard newsvendor problem and another to
participate in a game that is identical in probabilistic terms but presented as a pure lottery.
They conclude that these results are inconsistent with the random error model, and that the
explanation for this is that the ordering strategies for the newsvendor group are based on biased
order-to-demand mapping.
Rudi and Drake (2013) introduce demand censoring in the context of the “pull-to-center”effect.
Demand censoring, that is, a situation where subjects of the experiment cannot observe demand
when it exceeds the order quantity, is shown to lead to lower order quantities. In the case of a
high-profit situation, this magnifies the distance between optimal and observed order quantities.
Conversely, for cases with low profit it reduces this distance.
These explanations for the “pull-to-center” effect, interesting and sensible as they are, cannot
apply to our results. The reason for this is that our experimental data are obtained from subjects
that place only one order for each given set of parameters. In addition, we observe skewness
in the distribution of ordered quantities that is not predicted by the explanations mentioned
above. We discuss these issues from a theoretical perspective in Section 4.
Becker-Peth et al. (2013) construct a 3-parameter behavior model assuming that people consider
the upside and downside potential of their order decisions separately in line with the mental
accounting arguments (Thaler 1999) resulting in two separate accounts, one for sales and one
for leftovers. The different values associated with income from sales and returns (buyback) are
modeled by multiplying the income from return with a parameter larger than 1 to higher the
values of income from returns. The other parameters represent anchoring and chasing effects.
We use the same experimental data and offer what we think is a simpler explanation, i.e., that
the variation we see in the data can be explained by probabilistic cost efficiency combined with
risk aversion.
3 Probabilistic cost efficiency and statistical testing
The basic idea of probabilistic cost efficiency can be described as follows. Assume that N agents
choose between K alternatives with costs c1, . . . , cK . Consider two independent random samples
of the same size N , and let
z
(i)
k = number of times alternative k is chosen in sample i k = 1, . . . ,K, i = 1, 2.
7
When a sample of length N is drawn, we assume that the probability of choosing alternative k
is the same for each individual decision, and that all individual decisions are independent. A
probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pK) is probabilistically cost-efficient if and only if , for any
sample size N and for any pair of samples
K∑
k=1
ckz
(1)
k ≥
K∑
k=1
ckz
(2)
k ⇒
K∏
k=1
p
z
(1)
k
k ≤
K∏
k=1
p
z
(2)
k
k . (2)
That is, if a sample has greater total cost, it is always less probable. The interesting point here
is that if a probability distribution satisfies (2) for any pair of samples of arbitrary length, the
probability p must satisfy
pk =
e−βck∑K
j=1 e
−βcj
, (3)
where β ≥ 0 is a constant; see Erlander (2010) Chapter 4. The constant β measures agents’
sensitivity to utility. If β is very large, alternatives with maximum utility are chosen with
probability 1 at the limit. If β is very small, utility does not matter, and alternatives are equally
probable at the limit.
3.1 Erlander’s graphical test of probabilistic cost efficiency
We now discuss Erlander’s graphical test for probabilistic cost efficiency in detail. Assuming
any multinomial distribution (cost-efficient or not), we define the likelihood function L(z) and
the average cost c by
L(z) =
K∏
k=1
pzkk c =
1
N
N∑
k=1
zkck. (4)
If we replace p by its maximum likelihood estimate p = (z1/N, . . . , zK/N), we obtain
loglikelihood = LL(p) =
K∑
k=1
zk log[zk/N ]. (5)
where terms with zk = 0 are ignored because of the continuity extension limz→0+ z log[z] = 0.
We define bounded rationality by the statement: Agents are boundedly rational if and only if
more attractive states are chosen with larger probability. Assume that we observe M empirical
samples each with N agents, and make a plot of the log likelihood function against the observed
cost in each sample. If agents largely behave according to our definition, we would expect to see
a falling pattern like the one shown in Figure 1.
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cost
LL
Figure 1: Log likelihood values as a function of c
The rather informal diagnostic plot above is easily formalized into a rigorous statistical test,
and Erlander (2010) suggests an explicit formula for the confidence band in that test. There is,
however, a subtle oversight in Erlander’s proof, and this error causes his formula to be wrong for
any N . Erlander’s proof for the confidence band progresses through a sequence of asymptotic
approximations which are all correct until we reach the statement
−Ent(p) ≈ −Ent(p) + βc− βc¯+ 1
2N
H. (6)
In this formula, Ent is the entropy and the random variable H is given by the expression
H =
∑K
k=1(zk − Npk)2/Npk. Erlander assumes, correctly, that H is approximately χ2 when
N is large. In the formula for the confidence band, however, we need the distribution of H
conditional on the event
∑K
k=1
zk
N ck = c¯. If c¯ 6= c =
∑K
k=1 ckpk, we are conditioning on an event
with probability zero in the limit. It is then not clear what happens, and more work is needed
to compute the limit.
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Figure 2: Confidence bands for Erlander’s test. The curved lines show the correct band.
In Figure 2, we have drawn samples z of size N = 31 from the distribution in (3), assuming
that β = 0.002 and that the costs are (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5) = (612.5, 312.5, 112.5, 12.5, 12.5). For
each such sample, we have plotted the points (c, 1NLL(z)). Figure 2 shows the observed pattern
from 1000 such samples. The straight lines are computed using Erlander’s formula for a 95%
confidence band, while the curved lines are using a correct formula. The problem is that far too
many points lie above the upper straight line, and this problem do not vanish if we increase N .
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The key to the correct confidence band is the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1
Let z = (z1, z2, ..., zK) be multinomial (N, p1, p2, ..., pK), and X 2 =
∑K
k=1(zk −Npk)2/(Npk) be
the common χ2 expression. The distribution of X 2 − ρ21, conditionally on
∑K
k=1
zk
N ck = c¯, is
approximately (the error goes to zero as N →∞) χ2 with K − 2 degrees of freedom, where
ρ21 = N(c− c¯)2/
K∑
k=1
(ck − c)2pk c =
K∑
k=1
ckpk.
Proof
The proof consists of two parts. The first and difficult part is to prove that the conditional
asymptotic distribution of X 2 minus a deterministic term is χ2. The details are technical and
are provided in the appendix. Once we know that the difference is deterministic, it is clear that
the difference must equal the conditional minimum of the expression (the minimum of the χ2 is
zero). The details are straightforward and are omitted.

Since (6) in our notation is equivalent to to the statement
K∑
k=1
zk
N
log[
zk
N
] ≈
K∑
k=1
pk log[pk] + βc− βc¯+ 1
2N
K∑
k=1
(zk −Npk)2/(Npk). (7)
the following theorem follows directly from Proposition 3.1.
Theorem 3.2
Assume that N samples are drawn from a probabilistically cost-efficient distribution with costs
(c1, c2, . . . , cK) and parameter β. If c =
∑K
k=1
zk
N ck is the observed average cost and c =∑K
k=1 pkck is the expected cost, there is an approximately (the error goes to zero as N → ∞)
1-α percent probability that the observed log likelihood value
∑K
k=1
zk
N log[
zk
N ] is between
Upper[c] =
K∑
k=1
pk log[pk] + βc− βc¯+ (c¯− c)
2
2
∑K
k=1 pk(ck − c)2
+
1
2N
X 2α, (8)
and
Lower[c] =
K∑
k=1
pk log[pk] + βc− βc¯+ (c¯− c)
2
2
∑K
k=1 pk(ck − c)2
, (9)
where X 2α denotes the 1− α percentile in the χ2 distribution with K − 2 degrees of freedom.
Using the result in Theorem 3.2, we can easily establish a statistical test for probabilistic cost
efficiency. The idea is to make a few independent observation sets with the same cost structure,
and then, simply count how many of these have an observed log likelihood value exceeding the
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upper limit of the confidence band given by (8). The number of such sets can be relatively small
as the test can be executed via resampling, see Section 3.2.
In Figure 2 we used the valueN = 31. To check for accuracy, we constructed 100 000 independent
samples (each sample with N = 31), and found that a total of 6, 468 samples had a log likelihood
value exceeding the upper limit of the 95% confidence band given by (8). This shows that the
approximation may be reasonably good even when N is moderate in size. In comparison, the
linear bounds suggested by Erlander (2010) imply a total of 11, 778 points above the upper limit.
3.2 Resampling and an alternative test
In many cases we need to carry out the test based on a single observation. This is not necessarily
a problem as the test can be carried out via resampling. If the resampling seed is constructed
from several independent subsamples, the resampling error is small and the test can be executed
via Theorem 3.2. If the number of observations is very small, however, the original data cannot
be split into independent subsamples in a meaningful way. All resamples must then be drawn
from the original seed. In this case the resampling error has the same order of magnitude as
the original variation. As Theorem 3.2 is an asymptotic result, the expressions in (8) and (9)
are subject to error when N is small. We have tested several cases numerically, and resampling
together with the expressions (with Upper and Lower defined via (8) and (9))
Adjusted upper[c] = Upper[c] +
∆
2N
X 2α (10)
Adjusted lower[c] = Lower[c]− ∆
2N
X 2α (11)
can be used when N is small. The exact value of ∆ depends on N and the parameters in the
problem, and can be found by numerical simulation. The dependence is very slight, however,
and we found that the approximation ∆ ≈ 1 works well over a wide variety of cases. The
downside with resampling from the original seed is that it makes the confidence band broader,
leading to a rather weak test. To deal with this problem we suggest an alternative test. Our
new test will be based on the equivalence:
Probabilistic cost efficiency ⇔ Choices are drawn from an MNL model
While it would be very artificial to use the MNL logit model as a definition of bounded rationality,
we can stick with our original definition and use the equivalence above to formalize a statistical
test. The reader should note that this idea fails in the random utility framework as
Random utility theory 6⇐ Choices are drawn from an MNL model
Using the equivalence above, our new null hypothesis can be formulated as follows.
H0: There exists a constant β ≥ 0 such that pk = e−βck∑K
j=1 e
−βcj .
HA: The distribution is not of this kind.
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The test is conducted as follows. We first find a value of βˆ such that our model (under H0)
obtains the best possible fit in the sense of maximum likelihood. We define
pˆ
(0)
k =
e−βˆck∑K
j=1 e
−βˆcj
, ln[L0] =
K∑
k=1
yk ln[pˆ
(0)
k ], (12)
pˆ
(1)
k =
yk∑K
i=1 yi
, ln[L1] =
K∑
k=1
yk ln[pˆ
(1)
k ]. (13)
Here, yk refers to the observed values. With these definitions, under H0, the difference
X 2 = 2(ln[L1]− ln[L0]) (14)
is approximately χ2 with K − 2 degrees of freedom according to the standard maximum likeli-
hood theorem.
While we would be the first to admit that this test is very simplistic, the test is rigorously
supported by our original definition. We have never seen a test of this sort executed on data in
our particular context, and as we will demonstrate in Section 5, it provides definitive answers
to several empirical questions. The simplicity appears to be a strength not a weakness. We
hence believe that our new test is an interesting alternative to Erlander’s graphical test, which
as remarked in the introduction, is the only relevant test previously discussed in the literature.
4 Boundedly rational agents in the newsvendor model.
We will now consider a setting where the agents choose how much to order in a newsvendor
setting. The newsvendor model is specified as follows.
W = wholesale price per unit (fixed)
q = order quantity (rate chosen by the retailer)
R = retail price per unit (fixed)
D = demand (random rate)
S = salvage price per unit (fixed)
A retailer is trading a commodity and orders q units from a manufacturer. He hopes to sell
enough of these units to make a profit. We assume that the manufacturer offers a wholesale
price W , and that the retail price R is exogenously given. Unsold items can be salvaged at
the exogenously given salvage value S. A straightforward computation shows that the retailer
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maximizes expected profit when
P (D ≤ q) = R−W
R− S ⇒ qopt = F
−1
D
[
R−W
R− S
]
, (15)
where FD denotes the cumulative distribution of D. A perfectly rational newsvendor will hence
hence always order the quantity given by (15). Any deviation from the quantity given by (15)
will incur a cost which is the loss in expected profit in comparison with the optimal choice. A
boundedly rational newsvendor can order any quantity, but should have an inclination to make
orders leading to small costs. If Π(q) denotes the expected profit if the agent order q unit,
the cost c(q) is given by c(q) = Π(qopt) − Π(q). If we define bounded rationality in terms of
probabilistic cost efficiency, our definition leads to a MNL model with density
ψQ(q) =
e−βc(q)∫ dmax
dmin
e−βc(u)du
β ≥ 0. (16)
As Π(qopt) does not depend on q, it is easy to see that the particular value cancels in (16) and
that we might just as well work with the expression
ψQ(q) =
eβΠ(q)∫ dmax
dmin
eβΠ(u)du
β ≥ 0. (17)
In this section there are different levels of randomness, and it is important to keep these apart.
On the first level, we have randomness in the demand D. If we assume that D has a distribution
with density φD(x) on the interval [dmin, dmax], the expected profit in the newsvendor model is
a function Π = Π(q), and is given by
Π(q) = (R− S)ED[min[D, q]]− (W − S)q, (18)
Here, the subscript ED is used to emphasize that we have this expectation at the first level. At
the second level, the order quantity Q is a random variable with a multinomial logit density
ψQ(q) given by
ψQ(q) =
eβΠ(q)∫ dmax
dmin
eβΠ(u)du
β ≥ 0. (19)
We use the notation EQ to emphasize that we have this expectation for this density.
When researchers design economic experiments of the kind discussed in this paper, the parame-
ters in the experiment should be carefully selected to avoid bias. By an experimental design ED,
we mean the collection of parameters used in the experiment. To examine overall tendencies in
our experiment, we average our results over all the cases. We use the notation EED to signify
the average value over all the experiment in our experimental design ED, i.e., an expectation
where each particular case has uniform weight.
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4.1 Over/underordering
Su (2008) examined the sign of the error in ordering. In the case where D is uniform, he provided
a rigorous proof that agents overorder if qopt <
dmax+dmin
2 (low profit case) and underorder
if qopt >
dmax+dmin
2 (high profit case). This corresponds to the classical pull-to-center effect
discussed by many authors. He also obtained some partial results for the non-uniform case.
This analysis can, however, be compressed to only a few lines when it is done efficiently. The
key is the following observation: By a linear change of variables using the density specified by
(19), we see that
EQ[Q− qopt] =
∫ dmax
dmin
(q − qopt)ψQ(q)dq =
∫ dmax−qopt
dmin−qopt qe
βΠ(qopt+q)dq∫ dmax−qopt
dmin−qopt e
βΠ(qopt+u)du
. (20)
Proposition 4.1
Assume that D has arbitrary distribution, and let Π(q) be the expected profit when the retailer
orders q units.
• If for all q ∈ [dmin − qopt, dmax − qopt], the function Π satisfies
Π(qopt + q) ≥ Π(qopt − q) “overordering is better than underordering”, (21)
then we expect overorders in low profit cases, i.e., qopt <
dmax+dmin
2 ⇒ EQ[Q− qopt] > 0.
• If for all q ∈ [dmin − qopt, dmax − qopt], the function Π satisfies
Π(qopt + q) ≤ Π(qopt − q) “underordering is better than overordering”, (22)
then we expect underorders in high profit cases, i.e., qopt >
dmax+dmin
2 ⇒ EQ[Q− qopt] < 0.
Proof
In Figure 3 we have plotted q 7→ qeβΠ(qopt+q) between dmin − qopt and dmax − qopt in the two
principal cases. Note that the shaded areas are equally wide.
-
+
-
+
Figure 3: qopt <
dmax+dmin
2 (left) qopt >
dmax+dmin
2 (right)
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If (21) is satisfied, then the shaded area under the axis to the left is smaller than or equal to
the shaded area over the same graph. The positive values are hence at least as big and are
integrated over a strictly longer interval. This implies a net positive value in (20). If (22) is
satisfied, then the shaded area under the graph to the right is bigger than or equal to the shaded
area over the same graph. The negative values are hence at least as big and are integrated over
a strictly longer interval. This implies a net negative value in (20).

Proposition 4.1 generalizes Proposition 4 in Su (2008). In the particular case where the distri-
bution of D is uniform, it is evident that there exist constants C1, C2 such that
Π(q) = C1 − C2(q − qopt)2. (23)
In this case, conditions (21) and (22) are satisfied for an arbitrary qopt, and it follows that we
have overordering if qopt <
dmax+dmin
2 and underordering if qopt >
dmax+dmin
2 . This gives a new
proof of the pull-to-center effect in the uniform case.
As we can see, the analysis of the sign in the pull-to-center effect is straightforward. In the next
few sections, however, we will use the expression in (20) to examine the rate of change of this
effect. Even though some partials are discussed in Su (2008), these are alternative expressions
for the expected order, and are not related to the rate of change effect. Proposition 5 in Su
(2008) discusses changes in expected profit, but this result follows directly from the relation
∂EQ[c(Q)]
∂β
= −EQ[c(Q)2] + EQ[c(Q)]2 = −VarQ[c(Q)] < 0. (24)
and is not relevant to us. In our newsvendor problem, it is of interest to examine what happens
to the expected order when we change β. If we differentiate the expression in (20) w.r.t β, see
the appendix for details, we can see that
∂EQ[Q− qopt]
∂β
= EQ[Q ·Π(Q)]− EQ[Q] · EQ[Π(Q)] = CovQ[Q,Π(Q)]. (25)
In general,
∂EQ[Q−qopt]
∂β can be either negative or positive, depending on the relative strength of
the two terms in the middle of (25). The final result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 4.2
Assume that D is uniformly distributed on [dmin, dmax] and that the (sensitivity) parameter β
in (19) increases. Then the expected order decreases in low profit cases and the expected order
increases in high profit cases, i.e., the expected error in ordering decreases.
Proof
The proof is technical, and is shown in the appendix. The basic idea is to use the expectation
format in (25) to rewrite the expression to a form more suitable for analysis.

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Proposition 4.2 has an intuitive interpretation. If the retailer is more concerned about costs
(which is reflected in a larger β parameter), he is less inclined to deviate from the optimal order.
4.2 Skewness of underorders/overorders
In the empirical part of the paper we find that the overall size of the underorders is larger than
the overall size of the overorders. This happens even though the critical fractiles are unbiased,
i.e., the mean critical fractile is dmin+dmax2 . The purpose of this section is to explain that, under
certain conditions, this effect is what we expect when orders are selected via probabilistic cost
efficiency. The main result can be stated as follows:
Theorem 4.3
Assume that D is uniformly distributed on [dmin, dmax], and that ED is an experimental design
where given R,S, the selected values of W are always symmetric about R+S2 . Then, if orders
are chosen from a cost efficient distribution with parameter β and β = β(R,S,W ) is a strictly
increasing function of W , an overweight of underorders is expected, i.e., the average over all the
experiments in ED satisfies
EED[Q− qopt] < 0 (26)
Proof
The formal proof is technical, and all the details are shown in the appendix.

Even though the formal proof is somewhat elaborate, the essence of the proof is quite easy to
understand. If we choose two values W1 < W2 symmetric about
R+S
2 , the smaller value will lead
to underorder while the bigger value leads to overorder. When the the agents are boundedly
rational with the same value of β in the two cases, it is possible to show that the size of the
underorder will exactly match the size of the overorder. Under the conditions stated in the
theorem, however, the β value used with W1 is strictly smaller than the one used with W2.
According to Proposition 4.2, the error in ordering is reduced when we increase β. Therefore
the error in ordering using W2 is smaller than the error in ordering using W1, i.e., the agents
make larger errors when they underorder than when they overorder.
5 Analyzing empirical data
In this section we will use the theoretical machinery from Section 3 and 4 to analyse empirical
data. Ulrich Thonemann has kindly given us access to the data used in the paper Becker-Peth
et. al (2013). As Becker-Peth et. al (2013) contains the protocol and all specific information
related to the experiment, we will only provide a minimum of detail. The experiment can be
described (very roughly) as follows:
31 persons participated in the experiment. After a 15 minutes briefing on the newsvendor
problem and a warm-up phase presenting 5 different contracts, the data collection started with
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the following case: Assume that demand D is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 100], and
that R = 100,W = 80, S = 75. On the basis of this information the participants should suggest
order quantities, and the suggested order quantities were:
75, 82, 30, 50, 80, 100, 85, 45, 50, 100, 95, 70, 60, 80, 50, 50, 20,
90, 45, 70, 87, 50, 80, 50, 80, 20, 50, 55, 100, 80, 65. (27)
Our main research question can be phrased as follows: Is the observed set of orders consistent
with bounded rationality? According to our definition, agents are boundedly rational iff less
costly orders are more probable, i.e, the orders must be drawn from a cost-efficient distribution.
To carry of Erlanders graphical test, we need to sort the observations into K bins. With only 31
observations K = 5 is a more or less canonical choice, so we will start our analysis with that case.
The optimal order is qopt = 80 in this case. With K = 5 we partition the interval into 5 bins:
[0, 20]− [21, 40]− [41, 60]− [61, 80]− [81, 100]
The observed frequencies are
2 1 11 9 8. (28)
The cost associated with each bin can be computed in several different ways, and we will start
with costs defined in terms of the midpoint in each interval. The midpoint orders lead to the
costs
612.5 312.5 112.5 12.5 12.5. (29)
The next step is to draw resamples from the observed frequency distribution in (28). Using
N = 31, we compute the pair (c,LL(p)) from the formulas (4) and (5). The plot in Figure 4
shows a plot of these pairs after 200 resamples. In Figure 5 we have also drawn the upper and
lower limits for the 95% confidence band defined via (8), (9), (10), and (11).
60 80 100 120 140 160
c
-1.5
-1.4
-1.3
-1.2
-1.1
-1.0
LL
Figure 4: Likelihood values as a function of costs
Using 10000 resamples we recorded 9838 points within the 95% confidence band, and there is no
reason for reject our null hypothesis: All variation in the data can be explained from probabilistic
cost efficiency.
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In this particular case the finding is confirmed by the likelihood ratio test suggested in Sec-
tion 3.2. The best fit is obtained using βˆ = 0.00323, and using (12), (13), and (14) we report
X 2 = 5.26 which is well within the non-rejection region for a χ2 variable with 3 degrees of
freedom (7.81).
Non-rejection of the null-hypothesis does not in itself provide any strong support for our model.
The interesting feature with Erlander’s test is that the diagnostic plot shown in Figure 4 reveals a
distribution where the likelihood value falls with increasing costs. This suggests that the agents,
broadly speaking, are boundedly rational in the sense of our definition. This is supported by
the relatively low value of χ2 which indicates a fairly good model fit.
5.1 Robustness
The choice of K = 5 bins and costs specified via the mid-point in this bins is somewhat arbitrary.
To check if the conclusion is robust with respect to the number of bins, we carried out the same
analysis using K = 4 and K = 6 bins. The diagnostic plots for Erlanders graphical test are
shown in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Likelihood plots using K = 4, 5, 6 bins
We see that all 3 likelihood plots are falling, and with 10000 resamples the recorded values
within the bands: 9588, 9838, 9922 give no reason to reject that all variation can be explained
via probabilistic cost efficiency. The maximum likelihood test, too, offers the same conclusion.
The reported values are: χ2 = 4.25, 5.26, 8.43 and should be compared with the levels for rejec-
tion 5.99, 7.81, 9.49, respectively. All reported values hence lead to non-rejection.
The mid-point specification of cost is also somewhat arbitrary, but other specifications do not
seem to change the overall picture. Using the observed average cost within bins instead of
the midpoint specification, the reported values for the maximum likelihood test changes to:
χ2 = 3.66, 4.51, 7.06. The numerical values change, but the overall conclusion, non-rejection,
does not change.
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5.2 Analysis of the experimental data
In Becker-Peth et. al (2013) the experiment above was repeated 28 times with different combi-
nations of W,S. The value R = 100 was fixed throughout the experiments. We examined the
data in search of learning effects, but we could not find any noticeable development over time.
This is what we would expect as one would probably need a very large number of repetitions to
notice a learning effect. We hence assume that the 28 different cases can be handled as separate
experiments.
Even though we noted a few exceptions, the specification of costs is relatively unimportant. As a
clear majority leads to the same overall conclusion, we only report the findings with a mid-point
specification of costs.
In summary, the likelihood ratio test appears to be stronger than Erlander’s graphical test, and
we first take a look at the χ2 values for the likelihood ratio test. These values are reported in
Figure 6.
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Figure 6: χ2 values as a function of qopt, 4 (left), 5 (middle), and 6 (right) bins. The solid lines
show the rejection level.
As we can see from Figure 6, cases with small or big critical fractiles typically lead to non-
rejection, while the results in the middle range typically lead to rejection. Before we enter into a
general discussion, we consider similar plots for the β parameter. In this theory the β parameter
measures how sensitive the agents are with respect to costs. For each case a value of β was fitted
in the sense of maximum likelihood, and the reported values are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity to cost βˆ as a function of qopt, 4 (left), 5 (middle), and 6 (right) bins.
The 3 versions K = 4, 5, 6 are consistent and we conclude that the sensitivity to costs falls
with decreasing wholesale cost (significant by any standard). This makes good sense as it seems
logical that agents are more concerned about costs when goods are expensive. Note that the β
values are roughly equal in the 3 plots; the apparent difference is due to different scales on the
axes.
5.3 Small or big critical fractiles
When the critical fractile is smaller than 0.2 or bigger than 0.8, all findings are consistent. With
a small number of mild exceptions (which is expected at the 5% level), the likelihood ratio test
leads to non-rejection. The likelihood plots from Erlander’s graphical test are all falling, and
all cases lead to non-rejection. When the likelihood plots are falling, we are able to conclude
that agents, at least in a broad sense, behave according to our definition of bounded rationality.
This impression is strengthened by the relatively small χ2 values, which can be interpreted as
good model fits.
Skewness of overorders/underorders
According to the theory in Section 4.1, the agents can be expected to underorder when qopt ≥ 80
and to overorder when qopt ≤ 20. In our data set there are 7 cases of each kind. The differences
between the optimal and the average observed order is shown below.
−16 −19 −21 −17 −16 −11 −16
6 8 11 −2 5 9 7
The first row shows the 7 cases where qopt ≥ 80, while the second row shows the 7 cases with
qopt ≤ 20. We note that with one exception, the value −2 in the second row, the findings are
consistent with our theory. Moreover we see that the underorders are (by any standard) larger
than the overorders. This is just what we expect from Theorem 4.3. The plots in Figure 7
suggests that agents are more concerned about costs in low profit cases. When we increase
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W , the profitability goes down, leading to a larger value of β. The observed skewness is hence
consistent with probabilistic cost efficiency.
5.4 The middle range
When the critical fractile is in the interval (0.2, 0.8) the situation is less supportive. As we can
see from Figure 6, our null hypothesis is usually rejected in such cases. This means that our
model is unable to explain all the variation in the data. Note that rejection of the null hypothesis
does not render the model useless. It is still possible that the model explains a major part of the
variation and a good model fit is not excluded. The diagnostic plots from Erlander’s graphical
test provide some interesting insights. Figure 8 shows the likelihood plots for the four cases with
the highest values of χ2 in the likelihood ratio test.
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Figure 8: likelihood plots for the four worst cases (highest values of χ2)
While the third plot indicates a falling pattern, the other plots are questionable. If we compare
with the two other cases with critical fractile 0.5, the difference is striking, see Figure 9.
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Figure 9: likelihood plots for two cases with critical fractile 0.5
Inspection of the parameters used in these experiments offer a simple explanation to the prob-
lem. In Figure 8 the salvage parameter S has low values, while the values are high in Figure 9.
This principle appears to apply to most cases in the middle range. If the salvage value is high,
the likelihood plots are clearly falling combined with a fair model fit. If the salvage value is low,
the likelihood plots are questionable and the overall model performance is poor.
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5.5 Modelling risk aversion
While parameters sets with the same critical fractile lead to the same optimal order and expected
profit, cases where S is small are subject to more risk. We have
VarΠ(q) = Var[“random profit when ordering q units”] = (R− S)2Var[min[D, q]] (30)
It is then natural to ask if risk aversion could be an issue. When the agents are risk averse, the
perceived cost may be different from the loss in expected profit. A model taking this issue into
account could be
c(q) = Π(qopt)−Π(q) + λ ·VarΠ(q) (31)
where λ is a constant parameter reflecting the level of risk aversion, i.e., the shadow cost of a
variance constraint. Our new MNL model is hence equipped with two parameters, β measuring
the agents sensitivity to costs and λ measuring the amount of risk aversion. To each set of
observations we can fit parameter values in the sense of maximum likelihood. With D uniformly
distributed on [0, 100], we get
VarΠ(q) =
(R− S)2q3(400− 3q)
120 000
(32)
With our new specifications of costs, performance is greatly improved. All the likelihood plots
in Erlander’s graphical test are falling, and no cases are rejected. The same thing happens in
the likelihood ratio test, i.e., the cases leading to rejection in Figure 6 are now much better, see
Figure 10. In 28 experiments we should of course tolerate a small number of mild rejections,
so the overall conclusion is that our new model works surprisingly well. Moreover, the small
χ2 values imply that a good model fit is obtained in all cases. We are hence able to conclude
that the variation in all experiments can be explained by a combination of probabilistic cost
efficiency with risk aversion.
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Figure 10: χ2 values as a function of qopt, 4 (left), 5 (middle), and 6 (right) bins. The solid lines
show the rejection level.
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5.6 Model fit in terms of AIC
In our new model we have included a new parameter λ in comparison with the original model.
It is hence of interest to see how much an extra parameter improves performance in terms of the
Akaike information criterion AIC. In Table 1 we have computed AIC values for our original 1-
parameter model (AIC1par), for the new 2-parameter model including risk aversion (AIC2par),
and for a saturated model with 4 parameters (AIC4par), for the case K = 5 bins. In general we
should prefer a model with low AIC.
qopt AIC4par AIC2par AIC1par
5 17.86 13.87 11.87
6 25.06 24.26 22.26
7 25.93 22.76 20.76
9 27.05 25.78 23.78
13 32.50 28.94 27.17
20 45.58 41.91 41.05
20 28.72 25.03 27.22
24 30.74 26.78 30.94
29 37.26 33.40 34.80
35 29.47 25.47 41.59
36 38.17 34.34 40.65
41 37.72 33.86 45.07
50 39.41 36.60 47.27
50 53.97 49.97 48.61
50 39.84 36.52 49.93
50 51.70 48.89 46.89
59 44.54 41.06 49.52
64 51.38 48.36 49.75
65 44.07 41.29 49.88
71 44.02 41.20 50.89
76 46.01 45.25 47.57
80 50.28 48.64 46.91
80 52.91 50.22 50.38
88 49.24 46.05 44.48
91 49.14 46.11 44.42
93 42.14 38.49 37.12
94 44.62 41.11 39.11
95 35.63 35.53 33.53
Table 1: AIC values for 3 different model specifications (K = 5 bins)
The findings are very consistent. When the critical fractile is small or big, we should prefer the
simple 1-parameter model. In the middle range risk aversion is usually needed to explain the
observed behavior, and the 2-parameter model is our preferred choice.
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6 Technical summary
In this paper, we have established a link between probabilistic cost efficiency and bounded ra-
tionality in the newsvendor model. In our opinion, probabilistic cost efficiency is a superior
approach to bounded rationality, and we believe that this paper is the first to focus on this
connection in the context of newsvendor models.
In the paper we have made Erlander’s graphical test fully operational, and we have extended
the test such that it can be applied to small samples. The main advantage with Erlander’s test
is that it provides a diagnostic tool we can use to see if the agents largely behave according to
our definition. We also propose a likelihood ratio test that can be used for additional information.
The empirical analysis in Section 5 reveals several interesting insights that we believe are new.
• All the variation in our data can be explained by a combination of probabilistic cost
efficiency with risk aversion. When the critical fractile is small (< 0.2) or big (> 0.8), a
simple model without risk aversion is sufficient. In the middle range, a model with risk
aversion is needed to explain the data.
• The value of the β parameter (which measures sensitivity to costs) appears to decrease
when the critical fractile increases. Costs thus appear to be more important when goods
are expensive, which seems intuitive. It would be of interest to check whether this is true
for data sets other than ours.
• In our data set, we find that the underorders are consistently larger than overorders,
leading to an overall majority of underorders. We have proved that this is just what we
would expect from theory, see Theorem 4.3.
7 Concluding remarks
We believe that the theory in Section 4 is built on so much common sense that we would be
surprised if these effects are not present in almost any experiment on newsvendor behavior.
Moreover, we think that a corresponding bias must be present in real life cases. Managers
should understand the nature of this type of randomness, and use this knowledge to improve
performance. In the introduction we discussed several papers focusing the “pull-to-center” ef-
fect. While we are in no position to refute any of these theories, we suggest that there might
be a much simpler explanation, i.e., that the effect is driven by a systematic bias caused by
random choices. In a system driven by discrete choice, e.g., via random utility maximization,
the resulting distribution will be probabilistically cost efficient. Such choices are consistent with
our theory and no additional effect is needed to explain the pull-to-center effect.
The successful application of discrete choice models in several fields in economics demonstrates
that the effects that arise from pure randomness of this type are very real. Many applications
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report quite remarkable model fits, which in turn support a general belief that these models
reflect major trends in real world systems. We see no reason why a similar approach should be
less successful in the newsvendor context. In this paper we have demonstrated that these models
are able to explain non-trivial economic effects that are consistent with empirical observations.
Almost any problem in the newsvendor theory can be rephrased within this extended context,
and in general one could ask how strategies, profits and equilibria change if the newsvendor
choose orders from a cost efficient distribution. In that respect we feel this theory has a lot to
offer in terms of problems for future research, and hope that other researchers will pursue this
line of research.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
To prove this, we use a result by Satterthwaite (1942) that the distribution of a sum of n
squared standard normal variables with m inhomogeneous linear restrictions on the variables is
distributed as a shifted χ2 variable with n−m degrees of freedom. For the asymptotics of the χ2
statistic X 2 in the common K category multinomial case, we essentially start with n = K − 1,
and the theorem states that we lose a further degree of freedom by imposing a linear restriction.
Consequently, we must demonstrate that this restriction can be maintained in the proof of the
asymptotic result.
We can write zk =
∑N
i=1 xik so that (xi1, xi2, ..., xiK) for i = 1, 2, .., N are independent multi-
nomial (1, p1, p2, ..., pK). Then, the expectations, variances, and covariances are E[xik] = pk,
σkk = pk(1 − pk), and σjk = −pjpk, respectively. Because xiK = 1 −
∑K−1
k=1 xik, to avoid sin-
gularity we omit the last component and consider the column vector xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xiK−1)
′
with nonsingular (K−1)× (K−1) covariance matrix Σ = (σjk) and inverse Σ−1 = (σ−jk) where
σ−jj = 1/pj + 1/pK and σ
−
jk = 1/pK for j 6= k.
Let p = (p1, p2, ..., pK−1). In terms of the defined quantities, our X 2 may be expressed as X 2 =
N(x¯−p)′Σ−1(x¯−p). By the central limit theorem the distribution limit of u = √NΣ−1/2(x¯−p)
is N(0, I) as N →∞. This means that X 2 behaves as a sum of squares of K − 1 asymptotically
independent standard normal variables, and therefore behaves asymptotically as a χ2 variable
with K − 1 degrees of freedom. Henceforth, we assume we have a large N leading to a good
normal approximation. We can now write x¯ = p + 1√
N
B ·u where B = Σ1/2 so that in terms of
components we have zk = Npk +
√
N
∑K−1
j=1 Bkjuj for k = 1, 2, ...,K − 1. The omitted compo-
nent is then zK = N −
∑K−1
k=1 zk = NpK−
√
N
∑K−1
k=1
∑K−1
j=1 Bkjuj . By inserting the expressions
for all zk’s into the restriction Nc¯ = cKzK +
∑K−1
k=1 ckzk, we see that the restriction simplifies
to
∑K−1
j=1 bjuj = (c¯ − c)
√
N where bj =
∑K−1
k=1 (ck − cK)Bkj and c =
∑K
k=1 ckpk. Consequently,
we have shown that the restriction is carried over to a linear restriction for the uk variables.
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To apply Satterthwaite’s formula, we must normalize the coefficients so that their sum of squares
equals one. This is done by taking b2 =
∑K−1
j=1 b
2
j and aj = bj/b. Then, ρ1 =
∑K−1
j=1 ajuj =
(c¯−c)√N/b. The limiting distribution of X 2 is therefore a χ2 distribution with (K−1)−1 = K−2
degrees of freedom with its minimum shifted from zero to ρ21. Tedious calculations show that
b2 =
∑K
k=1(ck − c)2pk so that ρ21 = N(c− c¯)2/
∑K
k=1(ck − c)2pk. Alternatively, we can find the
expression for ρ21 solving for the minimum of the expression X 2 with respect to the zk’s under
the linear constraint.

8.2 How (25) is derived from (20)
Note that
EQ[Q− qopt] =
∫ dmax
dmin
qeβΠ(q)dq∫ dmax
dmin
eβΠ(u)du
− qopt
Elementary calculus (noting that qopt does not depend on β) gives
∂EQ[Q− qopt]
∂β
=
∫ dmax
dmin
qΠ(q)eβΠ(q)dq · ∫ dmaxdmin eβΠ(u)du− ∫ dmaxdmin qeβΠ(q)dq · ∫ dmaxdmin Π(q)eβΠ(u)du(∫ dmax
dmin
eβΠ(u)du
)2
= EQ[QΠ(Q)]− EQ[Q]EQ[Π(Q)]
8.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
To prove Proposition 4.2, we first need to prove the following non-trivial lemma.
Lemma A 1
Let a, b be any strictly positive real numbers, and consider the expression
Φ(a, b) =
∫ b
−a
u3e−u
2
du ·
∫ b
−a
e−u
2
du−
∫ b
−a
ue−u
2
du ·
∫ b
−a
u2e−u
2
du. (33)
• If a > b, then Φ(a, b) < 0.
• If a = b, then Φ(a, b) = 0.
• If a < b, then Φ(a, b) > 0.
Proof
For fixed b > 0, define φb : [0,∞)→ R by
φb(x) =
∫ x
−b
u3e−u
2
du ·
∫ x
−b
e−u
2
du−
∫ x
−b
ue−u
2
du ·
∫ x
−b
u2e−u
2
du. (34)
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If we differentiate this expression, we obtain
φ′b(x) =
∫ x
−b
(x3 + u3 − xu2 − x2u)e−u2−x2du. (35)
The key observation is the following
φ′b(x) =
∫ x
−b
(x− u)2(x+ u)e−u2−x2du. (36)
Now if x ≥ b, the integrand in (36) is strictly positive on (−b, x), and it follows that φb is strictly
increasing on (b,∞). Because φb(b) = 0, we obtain φb(x) > 0 on the open interval (b,∞), and
we define a new function ψb : [0,∞)→ R by
ψb(x) =
∫ b
−x
u3e−u
2
du ·
∫ b
−x
e−u
2
du−
∫ b
−x
ue−u
2
du ·
∫ b
−x
u2e−u
2
du. (37)
Change variables by v = −u, to see that
ψb(x) = −
∫ x
−b
v3e−v
2
dv ·
∫ x
−b
e−v
2
dv +
∫ x
−b
ve−v
2
du ·
∫ x
−b
v2e−v
2
dv. (38)
Hence, ψb(x) = −φb(x) for any b > 0 and any x ∈ [0,∞). Since by definition φb(x) = ψx(b),
it follows that φb(x) = −φx(b) which is strictly negative when 0 ≤ x < b since φx(b) is strictly
positive when b ∈ (x,∞) (from the first part of this proof).

We are now ready to prove Proposition 4.2. In general we have
∂EQ[Q− qopt]
∂β
= EQ[Q ·Π(Q)]− EQ[Q] · EQ[Π(Q)]. (39)
A key step in the proof is to add and subtract terms to see that
∂EQ[Q− qopt]
∂β
= EQ[(Q− qopt) ·Π(Q)]− EQ[Q− qopt] · EQ[Π(Q)]. (40)
When D is uniformly distributed, there exist constants C1, C2 where C2 > 0 such that
Π(q) = C1 − C2(q − qopt)2. (41)
If we insert that expression into (40), change variables as in (20), and simplify the expression,
we obtain
∂EQ[Q− qopt]
∂β
= −C2
∫ d
−c q
3e−β·C2q2dq∫ d
−c e
−β·C2q2dq
+
∫ d
−c qe
−β·C2q2dq∫ d
−c e
−β·C2q2dq
· C2
∫ d
−c q
2e−β·C2q2dq∫ d
−c e
−β·C2q2dq
. (42)
Here, c = qopt − dmin, d = dmax − qopt. Because C2 > 0, we see that the sign is determined by
27
the expression
−
∫ d
−c
q3e−β·C2q
2
dq ·
∫ d
−c
e−β·C2q
2
dq +
∫ d
−c
qe−β·q
2
dq ·
∫ d
−c
q2e−β·C2q
2
dq. (43)
If we make a second linear change of variables v =
√
β · C2 · q, the previous expression equals
− 1
β2C22
(∫ b
−a
v3e−v
2
dv ·
∫ b
−a
e−v
2
dv −
∫ b
−a
ve−v
2
dv ·
∫ b
−a
v2e−v
2
dv
)
, (44)
where a =
√
β · C2(qopt − dmin) and b =
√
β · C2(dmax − qopt). The conclusions in Proposition
4.2 then follow directly from Lemma A 1.

8.4 Details for the proof of Theorem 4.3
The key step in the proof of Theorem 4.3 is the following proposition:
Proposition A.2
Assume that D is uniformly distributed on [dmin, dmax], and that ED is an experimental design
where W , conditional on R,S, has a distribution that is symmetric about R+S2 . Then if β is a
constant with respect to W
EED[EQ[Q− qopt]] = 0. (45)
Proof
If D is uniformly distributed, it is easy to verify that in (23), C2 =
R−S
2(dmax−dmin) . Note that C2
does not depend on W . It follows from (20) that
EQ[Q− qopt] =
∫ dmax−qopt
dmin−qopt qe
−C2β q2dq∫ dmax−qopt
dmin−qopt e
−C2β q2dq
. (46)
If we define a function h by
h(x) =
∫ dmax−x
dmin−x qe
−C2β q2dq∫ dmax−x
dmin−x e
−C2β q2dq
, (47)
then h(qopt) = EQ[Q− qopt]. The key to the proof is to realize that h is antisymmetric around
x = dmax+dmin2 , i.e., that
h
(
dmax + dmin
2
− x
)
= −h
(
dmax + dmin
2
+ x
)
. (48)
The details are tedious but straightforward and are omitted. Note that the function h in (47)
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does not depend on W . In the newsvendor model with uniform demand D, we have
qopt = dmin + (dmax − dmin)R−W
R− S . (49)
We first assume that R,S are constants and that W has a continuous distribution with density
fW (w) on the interval [S, T ]. Then, by (47) and (49)
EW [EQ[Q− qopt]] =
∫ R
S
h
(
dmax + (dmax − dmin)R− w
R− S
)
fW (w)dw. (50)
Now, change variables by w = R+S2 + u to see that
EW [EQ[Q− qopt]] =
∫ R−S
2
−R−S
2
h
(
dmax + dmin
2
− u
(
dmax − dmin
R− S
))
fW
(
R+ S
2
+ u
)
du. (51)
Because the integrand is antisymmetric by (48) and our assumptions on fW , it follows that
EW [EQ[Q − qopt]] = 0. If R,S are not constants, extra levels of expectation do not change the
result and hence
EED[EQ[Q− qopt]] = 0. (52)
If W has a discrete distribution, exactly the same argument applies (just replace integrals with
sums). The result in (52) holds when W has any discrete or continuous distribution, which
proves the result in Proposition A.1 for any conceivable experimental design.

8.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3
It follows from Proposition A.2 that the net balance would have been zero if β = β
(
R+S
2
)
for all W . If W < (R + S)/2, then qopt >
dmax+dmin
2 . Because β(W ) < β
(
R+S
2
)
, if follows
from Proposition 4.2 that the order is decreased (leading to larger underorder) in comparison
with the case β = β
(
R+S
2
)
. Conversely, if W > (R + S)/2, then qopt <
dmax+dmin
2 . Because
β(W ) > β
(
R+S
2
)
, it follows from Proposition 4.2 that the order quantity is decreased (leading to
a smaller overorder) in comparison with the case where β = β
(
R+S
2
)
. In essence, the overorders
are reduced in size while the underorders are increased in size (in comparison with the neutral
case in Proposition A.2), which proves the theorem. 
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